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ABSTRACT  
 
In this paper, we test the role of the American investor sentiment in the amplification of 
the subprime financial crisis by examining the volatility spillover between the Standard & 
Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) returns and investor sentiment measures. We show a 
significant effect of investor sentiment variation on return and volatilities, and we reveal 
the contribution of returns shocks to the variability of investor sentiment variation during 
the subprime crisis. Moreover, we notice the determinant role of investor sentiment in the 
amplification of the subprime financial crisis by the intense spillover of volatility from 
investor sentiment to returns. Our finding indicates that investors can use investor 
sentiment as an indicator to predict returns-volatility.  
  
Keywords: investor sentiment, volatility spillover, subprime crisis, DCC-GARCH, 
variance decomposition, BEKK-GARCH 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Investor sentiment, like optimism, fear and panic, depends largely on stock price 
movements, especially during periods of high volatility. Indeed, this tranquil 
period characterised by an increase of stock prices enlarges the investors' 
optimism. However, during crisis periods, a sentiment of fear and panic is 
observed in financial markets. The US financial market has witnessed a high 
volatility period: the subprime crisis period. The subprime financial crisis that 
started in mid-2007 is considered one of the most serious and dramatic 
international financial crises of recent decades. Thus, this crisis may influence the 
relation between investor sentiment and returns.   
 
The study of the impact of investor sentiment on prices dynamics in 
financial markets is considered a central focus in behavioural finance. Two main 
issues on this topic are often considered. A growing number of empirical studies 
(Fisher & Statman, 2000; Baker & Wurgler, 2007; Schmeling, 2009) primarily 
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explore the relation between investor sentiment and returns. In fact, most studies 
suggest the existence of a negative relation between investor sentiment and 
expected returns. However, other recent studies (Yu & Yuan, 2011; Kling & Gao, 
2008) investigate the relation between investor sentiment and the volatility of 
return.   
 
 Investor sentiment, which can be defined as the feelings or attitudes of 
investors towards a security market or all financial markets, can be transmitted to 
financial markets through its transactions and choices. Behavioural biases, like 
loss aversion, pessimism and herding, can drive the market during a crisis period 
or one of political instability from bullish to very bullish. Thus, if investor 
sentiment has spillover effects on returns, we can anticipate market reactions 
during a crisis period, which is an important issue for analysts, fundamentalists 
and investors. Indeed, during a crisis period, an investor can correctly 
comprehend the dramatic decrease of prices and behave correctly in such a case 
without following the behaviour of the others investors. In the same context, if 
returns present spillover effects on investor sentiment, we expect a variation of 
investor sentiment, which can imply a variation of stock prices.   
 
Behavioural finance allows for better analysing and understanding the 
volatility and occurrence of financial crises according to the behaviour of 
investor sentiment. In fact, research in recent decades illustrates the role of 
behavioural biases, like loss aversion (Agarwal, 2008), extrapolation, herding and 
overconfidence (Redhead, 2008), in explaining the occurrence of the subprime 
and dot.com financial crises. Similarly, the feeling, mood and belief of the 
investor influence the probability of the occurrence of financial crises (Zouaoui, 
Nouyrigat, & Beer, 2010).  
 
An analysis of the literature shows that the relation between investor 
sentiment, stock market returns and volatility has received much attention, but 
there is a lack of evidence regarding this relation during the subprime crisis. 
Moreover, the volatility spillover between American investor sentiment and 
index returns remains uninvestigated during the subprime financial crisis. 
Therefore, in this study, our main objective is to empirically examine the 
volatility spillover between American investor sentiment and stock market 
returns. 
 
First, we examine both the relation between investor sentiment and price 
dynamics and the dynamic correlation between investor sentiment and returns. 
Second, we examine the effect of investor sentiment variation on stock market 
returns. Furthermore, we examine the effect of investor sentiment variation on 
return volatilities by estimating an augmented GARCH model. Then, we analyse 
the effect of returns shocks on investor sentiment variation by examining the 
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forecast variance decomposition. Finally, we focus on the volatility spillover 
between American investor sentiment and index returns by estimating the 
bivariate BEKK-GARCH model.   
 
 Our main contribution is to empirically investigate the role of investor 
sentiment in the amplification of the subprime financial crisis.  
 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is a large body of existing literature on investor sentiment. Several 
psychological studies suggest that investors' choices are influenced by emotional, 
cognitive and psychological factors. In this context, behavioural models, like 
Prospect Theory (PT), have been developed. According to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), the prospective value function of Prospect Theory is concave 
over gains (risk aversion for gains) and convex over losses (risk seeking for 
losses), and it is steepest in the loss domain. Prospect theory arguments have 
been increasingly used to explain phenomena observed in financial markets, such 
as the disposition effect, momentum (Menkhoff & Schmeling, 2006), excess of 
volatility, stock return predictability, and the equity premium puzzle. Using 
Prospect Theory, many studies, including those by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
and Abdelhédi-Zouch, Boujelbéne-Abbes and Boujelbéne (2012), propose an 
explanation of the equity premium puzzle using two behavioural concepts: loss 
aversion and mental accounting. Abdelhédi-Zouch et al. (2012) find that during a 
subprime crisis, the loss-averse investor becomes less attractive to risky assets.  
 
Moreover, studying the relation between investor sentiment and returns, 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) find evidence of a significant effect of investor 
sentiment on cross-section returns. This effect is stronger on small, younger, 
unprofitable, high-growth and non-dividend-paying firms. Kling and Gao (2008) 
find that the Chinese investor sentiment follows a positive feedback process. 
Indeed, lagged positive returns lead optimism in the market. However, lagged 
negative returns lead pessimism in the financial market. Schmeling (2009) 
suggests the existence of a significant relation between sentiment and expected 
returns.  
 
A growing number of empirical studies infer the influence of investor 
sentiment on the volatility of returns. Kling and Gao (2008) study the impact of 
investor sentiment and conditional variance of investor sentiment on the 
conditional variance of stock returns. Their results confirm a significant relation 
between investor sentiment and the conditional variance of stock returns, but 
reject the volatility spillover between Chinese investor sentiment and returns. 
Chuang, Ouyang, and Lo (2010) document a negative relation between volatility 
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and returns in the Taiwanese market. Qiang and Shu-e (2010) find that the 
fluctuation of investor sentiment asymmetrically affects the fluctuation of stock 
prices. Indeed, the change of stock prices depends on positive or negative 
investor sentiment changes. These authors suggest that the volatility resulting 
from investor sentiment changes represents systematic risk. Yu and Yuan (2011) 
analyse the effect of investor sentiment on the relation between returns and 
volatility. They find a negative correlation between volatility and returns during 
low-sentiment periods.  
 
 The crisis appearance attracts authors' attention to study the effects of 
investor behaviour during a crisis period. Redhead (2008) suggests that the 
dot.com bubble observed in the year 2000 was created due to the economic, 
financial and social factors and due to the effect of behavioural bias. He suggests 
that before the dot.com bubble, behavioural biases contributed to an increase in 
prices in financial markets. After, however, behavioural biases contributed to a 
dramatic decrease of prices, thus creating the bubble. Indeed, Hirshleifer (2001) 
indicates that in the stock market, investors follow the behaviours of other 
investors (herding bias) without any reason. In fact, stocks acquired by an 
investor provide useful information to other investors in that the price will 
continue rising in the future, encouraging them to buy these stocks (informational 
cascade).  
 
 In addition, the level of optimism in financial markets before the 
dot.com bubble influenced investment decisions (buying behaviour). Boswijk, 
Hommes and Manzan  (2007) found that at the end of 1990, most investors 
followed the market trend (momentum). Thus, these behavioural biases 
contributed to an increase in prices in financial markets. However, in the year 
2000, the market was marked by the introduction of several technology 
companies; consequently, the number of shares available on the market exceeded 
the number of shares requested by investors. Thus, technology companies have 
decreased the prices of their securities. This phenomenon leads to a decrease in 
prices in the financial market, which contributes to the emergence of a negative 
social mood in the market. Redhead (2008) suggests that financial markets have 
become dominated by very pessimistic investors who sell their undervalued 
stocks. Therefore, the decrease of sentiment (extrapolation of bad news) implies a 
decrease of stock prices, and the decrease of stock prices implies a decrease of 
sentiment (vicious circle).  
 
 The same behaviour is observed in financial markets during the 
subprime crisis. Behavioural biases, like optimism and herding, contribute to the 
increase of prices. However, the smallest decrease in prices, due to mortgage 
prices, implies a negative mood in the financial market. This negative mood, 
associated with herding and extrapolation, implies a dramatic decrease of prices.   
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DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
Data 
 
This study uses daily S&P 500 index returns and investors' sentiment indexes. 
The sentiment indexes are the new implied volatility of the S&P 500 index 
(VIX), the new implied volatility for the Nasdaq 100 (VXN) and the put-call 
ratio.  
 
The sample period is from January 1999 until January 2009. Because this 
period includes the subprime crisis period, we divided the sample period into two 
sub-periods: the tranquil period (from January 1999 to June 2007) and the period 
during the subprime crisis (from July 2007 to January 2010). The split of these 
periods is based on the results of the Chow breakpoints test (F-statistic = 
514.525, probability = 0.000), which suggests that the subprime crisis started in 
the US in July 2007.   
    
This study employs data from two sources: the closing price data of the 
S&P 500 market index provided by the Datastream database, and the data on 
VIX, VXN and put-call ratio sentiment indexes drawn from the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange. 
 
VIX index    
 
VIX is a key measure of the expected volatility of the S&P 500 index. The VIX 
Index represents a volatility index, which comprises options that reflect the 
market's expectation of future volatility over 30 calendar days (Chicago Board 
Options Change, CBOE, 2014). It is computed as the square root of the risk-
neutral expectation of the S&P 500 variance over the next 30 calendar days, 
which is then annualised. VIX, originally developed by Whaley (1993), 
represents future market volatility on the prices of the S&P 100 for the next 30 
days. In 2003, the Chicago Board Options Exchange introduced the new VIX of 
expected volatility for the next 30 days of the S&P 500 index (Whaley, 2009). 
The expected implied volatility is estimated by averaging the weighted prices of 
the S&P 500 puts and calls over a wide range of strike prices. For example, if the 
VIX is 20, this corresponds to an expected annualized standard deviation of less 
than 20% over the next 30 calendar days; therefore, the investor can suppose that 
the index option markets expect the S&P 500 to change up or down 20%/√12 = 
5.78%. VIX is thus more broadly a gauge of investors' confidence on market 
movements and is dubbed as the investor fear gauge in financial markets. In fact, 
the VIX index reaches a high level in the bearish market and a low level in the 
bullish market.  
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VXN index 
 
The new VXN reflects the investors' emotions, such as greed and fear, towards 
the financial market conditions. It aims to represent a measure of implied 
volatility for the Nasdaq 100 for the next 30 calendar days. It is calculated by the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange using the same methodology used to calculate 
the new VIX.  
 
Put-call ratio  
 
The put-call ratio is a contrarian investor measure in financial markets. A high 
level of put-call ratio indicates a strong pessimism in financial markets. However, 
a low level of put-call ratio indicates investors' optimism.  
 
The put-call ratio, an indictor of investor sentiment, is calculated using 
the volume of puts options divided by the volume of calls options. The 
anticipation of falling prices in financial markets leads an investor to buy puts, 
consequently increasing the put-call ratio.      
     
Methodological Approach  
 
The impact of investor sentiment on stock prices and the contribution of this 
sentiment to crisis occurrence have become major topics in financial studies in 
recent years. Thus, we first inspect the dynamic movement of American investor 
sentiments and S&P 500 index prices. 
 
The correlation between investor sentiment measures and returns depends 
on the number of positive and negative returns. Thus, we test the dynamic 
correlation between investor sentiment measures and returns using the Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) model.     
   
Engle (2002) introduced the DCC-GARCH model to measure the time 
varying correlation between series. In this context, we need the standardised 
residuals to measure the time varying correlation between investor sentiment 
measures and returns. We first use the GARCH (1,1) model to determine 
standardised residuals. These residual are then used for estimating the DCC-
GARCH.   
 
We then examine the effect of the dynamics of American investors' 
sentiment on the stock market return. Particularly, we test the relation between 
positive (negative) change of investor sentiment and the return of the S&P 500 
index by estimating the following regression: 
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where Rt is the return of the S&P 500 index, St is the investor sentiment measure, 
and Δ St is the change of investor sentiment. 
 
 We next examine the effect of investor sentiment variation on return 
volatilities. Several empirical studies infer that investor sentiment predicts the 
volatility of returns. Kling and Gao (2008) added the investor sentiment in the 
mean and the variance equations of the GARCH model to test the effect of 
sentiment on returns and volatilities. Thus, we follow Kling and Gao (2008), and 
we test the augmented GARCH model, which includes only the variation of 
sentiment in the variance equation because the effect of investor sentiment in the 
return is tested in the previous estimation.  
 
The augmented GARCH model is as follows:   
                   
           2 2 20 1 1 2t t t tw Sσ α ε βσ β− −1= + + + Δ                                          (2)  
                          
where α0 captures the ARCH coefficients, β1 captures the GARCH coefficients 
and β2 captures the effect of the change of investor sentiment (ΔSt) on the 
conditional variance of returns ( 2tσ ).  
 
 It is important to test the effect of returns on changes of investor 
sentiment. We then study the impact of return shocks on investor sentiment 
variation by employing the forecast error variance decomposition estimated from 
the VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model.        
 
The current financial crisis presents a high volatility of investor sentiment. Thus, 
we finally investigate the volatility spillover between investor sentiment and 
returns by estimating the following bivariate GARCH-BEKK model:  
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t t t t
t t t t
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                                               (3) 
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The BEKK parameters (Engle & Kroner, 1995) of the GARCH model are as 
follows:   
                                1 1
1 1
' ' ' 'q p
t i t t i i t i
i i
H A A BH Bε ε− −1 −
= =
=ΩΩ+ +∑ ∑                       (5) 
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where Rt represents returns of the S&P 500 index and St represents investor 
sentiment. λ12 represents the degree of mean spillover effects from the investor 
sentiment to the returns. λ21 represents the degree of mean spillover effects from 
the returns to the investor sentiment. Ω is a lower triangular matrix of constants. 
The symmetric matrix A captures the ARCH effects, while the matrix B focuses 
on the GARCH effects. Β11 represents the GARCH parameters. α11 represents the 
ARCH parameters. α12 and β12 represent the degree of variance spillover effects 
from the investor sentiment to the returns. α21 and β21 represent the degree of 
variance spillover effects from returns to investor sentiment. In this paper, we 
assume p = q = 1. Volatility spillover is investigated by the significance of α11  
and β11.  
      
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Movement of Investor Sentiment Indexes and S&P 500 Returns  
 
In this section, we focus on the time path of S&P 500 index prices and investor 
sentiment before and during the subprime crisis period. Figure 1 provides plots of 
the time path of S&P 500 index prices and the sentiment measures (VIX, VXN 
and put-call ratio) from January 1999 until January 2009. 
 
We clearly show an inverse movement of investor sentiment measures 
and index prices. The decrease in index prices is associated with an increase in 
investor sentiment measures. Similarly, the increase in index prices is associated 
with a decrease in investor sentiment measures. Thus, the bear market exhibits 
strong panic and pessimism. However, when the market is bullish, an optimism 
sentiment dominates the financial market. Indeed, during the 2000–2002 
technological crisis period, the VIX index reached 45 following the drop of index 
prices. Further evidence of inverse movement between investor sentiment and 
returns appears in the 2003–2006 period. During this tranquil period, we clearly 
show a reprise of investor confidence. In fact, this period is characterised by an 
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excess of optimism and investor confidence in financial markets. Indeed, the VIX 
and VXN indexes reached low values, approximately 15 and 20, respectively. 
 
	  
	  
 
Figure 1. Movement of S&P 500 index prices and investor sentiment  
The subprime financial crisis led to bankruptcy for many financial institutions 
listed in the U.S financial markets. Indeed, this crisis grew into a serious slump of 
stock prices, which led the VIX and VXN sentiment measures to increase and 
peak at the end of 2008. Indeed, during the subprime crisis, the VIX index 
exceeded 80, against 45 during 2000 and 2002. This maximum increase shows 
the high magnitude of the current financial crisis. We can conclude that the 
decline in prices during the subprime crisis caused a disruption in investor 
sentiment. The US financial markets experienced remarkable investor pessimism.  
 
 Therefore, the contribution of behavioral finance is very important for 
understanding the relation between stock prices and investor sentiment, 
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especially during the financial crisis. This result incites us to study the correlation 
between investor sentiment and returns.  
 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation between Investor Sentiment and Returns  
 
To make investment decisions, individual and institutional investors focus on the 
correlation between investor sentiment and returns. In this section, we analyse the 
dynamic correlation between returns and investor sentiment measures by 
estimating the DCC-GARCH model. Figure 2 plots the dynamic correlation 
between investor sentiment and index returns before and during the subprime 
crisis.  
 
We find strong evidence of time with a varying negative correlation 
between S&P 500 index returns and investor sentiment. Some turmoil periods 
provide an extremely high negative correlation. However, some tranquil periods 
provide a low correlation between returns and sentiment. Indeed, during the 
2003–2005 tranquil period, the correlation between returns and investor 
sentiment measured by VIX reached –0.18, while it reached –0.33 during the 
subprime financial crisis. Thus, negative returns have a greater effect on investor 
sentiment than positive returns. In addition, the subprime crisis led to more ripple 
effects on the correlation than the dot.com crisis. The magnitude of the fall in 
prices during the subprime crisis had a great effect on investor sentiment, 
especially on sentiment measured by the VIX and put-call ratio. Indeed, the VIX 
and put-call ratio sentiment measures had a larger negative correlation, –0.33 and 
–0.5, respectively, than those of the VXN index of –0.10 during the subprime 
crisis. Consequently, returns and investor sentiment measured by the implied 
volatility index exhibited a stronger negative correlation during low-sentiment 
periods (e.g., subprime crisis period). This finding confirms the results of Yu and 
Yuan (2011), suggesting that the negative correlation between returns and 
volatility is higher during low-sentiment periods.  
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Figure 2.  Dynamic correlation between S&P 500 index returns and investor 
sentiment 
  
Relation between the Change of the Investor Sentiment and Returns 
 
In this section, we examine the relation between investor sentiment variation and 
returns by estimating Equation 1. Table 1 illustrates the estimation results for the 
VIX, VXN and put-call ratio investor sentiment measures. Panel A reports the 
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results for the tranquil period, and Panel B reports the results during the subprime 
crisis.  
 
Table 1 
Impact of investor sentiment variation on index returns 
 
	  	   Panel A: Tranquil period Panel B: During subprime crisis 
Horizon VIX VXN (Put-Call) Ratio VIX VXN 
(Put-Call) 
Ratio 
C 
0.0001 
(0.8888) 
0.0001 
(0.4986) 
0.0004* 
(2.0033) 
–0.0007 
(–0.7169) 
–0.0008 
(–0.7644) 
–0.0013 
(–1.1808) 
α1 
–0.0072** 
(–60.4222) 
0.0001 
(0.5364) 
–0.0163** 
(–9.7566) 
–0.0077** 
(–4.3138) 
–0.0074** 
(–4.2724) 
–0.0004 
(–0.0560) 
 
Note: *,**, denote significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. t-statistic is reported into parenthesis. The 
unit root test of Dickey-Fuller rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series of index sentiment measures 
and returns. 
 
We show that the changes of investor sentiment measures have a significant 
effect at the 1% level of the S&P 500 returns before and during the subprime 
crisis. This effect is significantly negative for sentiment measured by the VIX 
index and the put-call ratio before the subprime crisis and for the VXN and VIX 
indexes during the crisis period. 
 
 Thus, the increase in investor sentiment variations implies a decrease in 
the S&P 500 and, consequently, an increase in negative returns frequency. 
However, the decrease in investor sentiment variations implies an increase in the 
S&P 500 and, therefore, an increase in positive returns frequency.  
 
 The investor sentiment measured by the VIX has a slightly greater effect 
on returns during the subprime crisis than during the tranquil period. This  effect 
is about –0.0072 before the crisis, and it is about –0.0077 during the crisis. These 
results occur because investor sentiment is more disturbed during the subprime 
crisis. Thus, the effect of change in investor sentiment on returns is higher during 
this period.   
 
Relation between the Change in Investor Sentiment and Volatility  
 
To examine the incremental ability of investor sentiment in affecting return 
volatilities, we estimate the augmented GARCH model, which includes the 
variation of sentiment in the variance equation (Equation 2). The estimation 
results are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports the results for the tranquil 
period, and Panel B reports the results during the subprime crisis.  
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 The results reveal that the inclusion of the investor sentiment variation in 
the variance equation (β3) is significantly positive before and during the subprime 
crisis. Before the subprime crisis, all measures of sentiment are significant at the 
1% level. Thus, the increase in the variation of the VIX, VXN and put-call ratio 
reflects a disruption in investor sentiment. This unstable sentiment increases the 
irrational transactions, which consequently increase the volatility. Thus, we 
support the results of Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002), suggesting that investor 
sentiment presents a significant effect on volatility in the US financial markets.       
 
 During the subprime crisis period, the investor sentiment measured by 
VIX and VXN positively influences volatility in the US financial market. The 
disruption of investor sentiment following panic and fear sentiments on the 
impact of the subprime crisis on financial institutions and all other firms listed in 
financial markets reinforces investors to rapidly sell their stocks. This attitude 
during the subprime crisis implies a dramatic decrease in stock prices and a sharp 
increase in volatility. 
 
 The results of Table 2 show that the investor sentiment, measured by the 
put-call ratio, explains the volatility of returns only before the crisis. Thus, we 
can conclude that the VIX and VXN investor sentiment measures are appropriate 
indicators to predict volatility of returns both during tranquil and turmoil periods.   
 
We clearly show that the contribution of return shocks on variability in 
investor sentiment variation is greater during the subprime crisis than during the 
tranquil period for sentiment measured by the VXN and put-call ratio. The 
impact of return shocks is slightly less than 10% on the put-call ratio during the 
tranquil period. Similarly, the returns shocks have a negligible impact on the 
VXN index. However, the contribution of return shocks on the variability in the 
investor sentiment variation is very high for the VIX index during the tranquil 
period.  
  
Impact of Returns on Investor Sentiment Variation 
 
In the previous sections, we examined the impact of investor sentiment variation 
on returns and volatility. In this section, we study the effect of returns shocks on 
the investor sentiment variation by examining the forecast error variance 
decomposition estimated from the VAR model. Table 3 presents the percentages 
of the forecast error of the investor sentiment variation that can be explained by 
returns at different horizons from 1 day to 10 days. Panel A reports the results for 
the tranquil period, and Panel B reports the results during the subprime crisis. 
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Table 2 
Impact of investor sentiment variation on volatility 
 
	  	   Panel A: Tranquil period Panel B: During subprime crisis 
 VIX VXN (Put-Call) Ratio VIX VXN 
(Put-Call) 
Ratio 
w 2.73E-07** 
(3.4145) 
2.23E-07* 
(1.9949) 
9.49E-07 
(1.3966) 
4.29E-06** 
(3.0926) 
4.52E-06** 
(2.5891) 
7.86E-06* 
(2.1775) 
α0 0.0201** 
(5.0357) 
0.0276** 
(5.6618) 
0.0223** 
(2.6354) 
0.0265** 
(2.6867) 
0.0440** 
(2.6333) 
0.1125** 
(3.3770) 
β1 0.9769** 
(223.3971) 
0.9711** 
(180.0053) 
0.9559** 
(45.3081) 
0.9559** 
(84.5056) 
0.9384** 
(54.3377) 
0.8706** 
(23.7284) 
β2 1.19E-05** 
(11.6910) 
6.52E-06** 
(9.5235) 
6.97E-05** 
(4.9609) 
3.40E-05** 
(7.3876) 
3.74E-05** 
(6.2055) 
1.06E-05 
(0.0847) 
 
*, **, denote significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. t-statistic is reported into parenthesis. 
Table 3 
Variance decomposition of investor sentiment measures 
 
 Panel A: Tranquil period Panel B: During subprime crisis 
Horizon VIX VXN (Put-Call) Ratio VIX VXN 
(Put-Call) 
Ratio 
1 63.4368 0.0213 10.8777 0.5919 2.3068 1.3955 
2 63.5178 0.0238 8.4128 3.2227 6.7444 16.9521 
3 63.6892 0.0601 9.5197 11.4199 14.8960 18.3594 
4 63.6902 0.0602 9.9328 15.6286 18.8576 19.4743 
5 63.6907 0.0603 9.8871 17.7601 20.9146 20.2493 
6 63.6907 0.0603 9.9000 19.4935 22.5245 20.2517 
7 63.6907 0.0603 9.9102 20.9073 23.8058 20.2956 
8 63.6907 0.0603 9.9099 22.0124 24.8051 20.3125 
9 63.6907 0.0603 9.9098 22.9272 25.6278 20.3123 
10 63.6907 0.0603 9.9100 23.7084 26.3260 20.3131 
 
 Variance decomposition results suggest that returns shocks present an 
important source of daily volatility of investor sentiment variation during the 
subprime crisis period. This effect increases with the increase in the horizon, For 
a 1-day horizon, this effect is slightly less than 3%. However, for a 10-day 
horizon, return shocks present more than 20% of the variance in investor 
sentiment variation measured by the VIX, VXN and put-call ratio. This high 
effect during the subprime crisis is observed in the high frequency of negative 
returns. Indeed, the dramatic decrease in stock prices significantly affects the 
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investor's feelings and emotions. Consequently, returns shocks imply 
considerable volatility of investor sentiment variation.   
 
Volatility Spillover between Investor Sentiment and Returns 
 
To investigate the role of American investor sentiment in the amplification of the 
subprime crisis, we examine the spillover of volatility between investor sentiment 
and returns before and during the subprime crisis. Thus, we estimate the bivariate 
BEKK-GARCH model. Table 4 presents the estimated results of the mean and 
variance spillover. Panel A reports the results during the tranquil period, and 
Panel B reports the results during the subprime crisis period.  
 
 The results indicate that the coefficient λ12 measuring the mean spillover 
from the investor sentiment on returns is not significant before and during the 
subprime crisis for all measures of sentiment, except for the put-call ratio before 
the crisis. Considering these results, we can conclude there is an insignificant 
effect of investor sentiment on returns. These results confirm those of Brown and 
Cliff (2004). These authors found that investor sentiment weakly explains 
returns, although investor sentiment and returns are highly correlated. 
 
 The analysis of the mean spillover between returns and investor 
sentiment shows that there is clear evidence of mean spillover from returns to 
investor sentiment before and during the subprime crisis, except for the VIX 
index before the crisis. Consequently, return shocks significantly affect investor 
sentiment. From these results, we can conclude that the mean spillover is 
unidirectional from returns to investor sentiment.   
 
 Table 4 indicates that returns were negatively affected by their own 
shocks during the subprime crisis. Indeed, the coefficient, which assesses the 
mean spillover from returns to returns, was significantly negative during the 
subprime crisis period.  
 
 In the same sense, we find that the fluctuation of current investor 
sentiment significantly affects the future sentiment before the subprime crisis. 
Indeed, the coefficients of all sentiment measures are significant. The positive 
mean spillover from the past VIX (VXN) to the future VIX (VXN) suggests that 
investors use the past implied volatility to predict future volatility. Thus, we 
confirm the existence of extrapolation bias in the US financial market.   
    
 Significant GARCH coefficients β12 indicate significant spillovers from 
sentiment to returns before and during subprime crisis. Moreover, the volatility 
spillover is more pronounced during the subprime crisis than before. Results 
indicate that volatility spillover running from the put-call ratio to returns is equal 
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to 0.3 during subprime crisis, while it is 0.07 during the tranquil period. This 
finding can be explained by the lack of confidence of the American investor in 
financial markets during the current crisis, which is caused by fear and panic 
towards dramatic negative returns.  
 
Table 4 
Mean and variance spillover between investor sentiment and returns 
 
  Panel A: Tranquil period Panel B: During subprime crisis 
 
S&P 500 
VIX 
S&P 500 
VXN 
S&P 500 
 (Put/Call) 
Ratio 
S&P 500 
VIX 
S&P 500 
VXN 
S&P 500 
 (Put/Call) 
Ratio 
 Mean spillover 
λ11 
0.0115 
(0.5411) 
0.0302 
(–1.3083) 
–0.0356 
 – (1.0323) 
 –0.191*** 
(–3.3917) 
–0.063 
(–0.7699) 
–0.193*** 
(–3.5128) 
λ12 
–0.0281 
(–0.3242) 
–0.0407 
(–0.7546) 
0.3962** 
(2.1308) 
–0.3075 
(–1.1281) 
0.4607 
(0.3715) 
0.0141 
(0.5143) 
λ21 
0.0072*** 
(10.3259) 
0.0073*** 
(8.7669) 
–0.0242*** 
(–5.0879) 
–0.0088 
(–1.1999) 
0.0010*** 
(11.2914) 
–0.1507** 
(–2.0478) 
λ22 
0.9832*** 
(262.4950) 
      0.9921*** 
(419.6021) 
0.3082*** 
(9.7870) 
–0.0224 
(–0.4760) 
0.9818*** 
(696.6807) 
0.0112 
(0.2356) 
 Variance spillover 
α11 
0.0223 
(0.4515) 
0.0555 
(0.9383) 
0.1470* 
(1.7596) 
0.3336*** 
(9.1151) 
–0.0654 
(–0.6566) 
0.3357*** 
(8.4012) 
α12 
0.0050*** 
(4.0458) 
0.0042*** 
(2.6059) 
–0.0219*** 
(–3.8958) 
–0.0105 
(–0.9281) 
0.0012*** 
(10.0049) 
–0.1536 
(–1.3547) 
α21 
0.1204 
(0.1657) 
3.8676*** 
(3.0167) 
1.3213** 
(2.5515) 
0.6882* 
(1.9152) 
–13.821 
(–0.6351) 
0.0369 
(1.2636) 
α22 
0.3762*** 
(14.4703) 
0.2833*** 
(8.2952) 
0.0577 
(1.3928) 
0.0707 
(0.5431) 
1.0635*** 
(22.1958) 
0.1893 
(1.5819) 
β11 
0.7337*** 
(192.3529) 
0.6330*** 
(4.9858) 
–0.6447*** 
(–3.9655) 
0.9335*** 
(55.1110) 
–0.7906*** 
(–6.3267) 
0.9366*** 
(68.4920) 
β12 
0.0065*** 
(107.4314) 
0.0081*** 
(3.7780) 
0.0752*** 
(3.4891) 
0.0299** 
(2.4504) 
0.0007*** 
(4.8315) 
0.3089*** 
   (3.1634) 
β21 
0.6224 
(1.6341) 
–1.0700** 
(–2.2185) 
–0.5854 
(–0.5346) 
–0.1338 
(–0.2166) 
27.2785 
(1.4106) 
–0.0198 
(–0.4761) 
β22 
0.8953*** 
(82.0259) 
0.9378*** 
(72.7723) 
1.0081*** 
(23.4669) 
–0.2422 
(–0.4625) 
–0.0234 
(–1.1722) 
–0.3205 
(–0.9937) 
 
*, **, denote significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. t-statistic is reported into parenthesis. 
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 The spillover of pessimism sentiment to returns during the subprime 
crisis led to an increase of return volatility in the American financial market. This 
result suggests that the investor sentiment exhibits a determinant role in the 
amplification of the current financial crisis and constitutes a channel of volatility 
transmission.     
 
 Overall, the volatility spillover is unidirectional from investor sentiment 
to returns. Similarly, the mean spillover is unidirectional from returns to investor 
sentiment. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The financial markets have witnessed a serious decline of stock market prices 
during the subprime financial crisis, which caused a disruption of US investor 
sentiment. Indeed, the US financial markets have experienced a remarkable 
pessimism. In this paper, we empirically investigate the volatility spillover 
between American investor sentiment and returns, particularly during the 
subprime crisis period. 
 
  The analysis of the time path of investor sentiment measures and S&P 
500 index prices reveals that the decline in prices during the subprime crisis is 
associated with a disruption of investor sentiment (increase of VIX and VXN 
indexes). Moreover, we show that the dynamic conditional correlation between 
investor sentiment measures and returns is negative and very high during a period 
of turmoil.    
   
  Our assessment of the impact of investor sentiment changes on returns 
indicates that the variation in sentiment significantly influences returns. 
Moreover, this effect is higher during the subprime crisis than during the tranquil 
period. The augmented GARCH model is estimated to test the impact of the 
change in investor sentiment on the volatility of return. We clearly find that the 
change in investor sentiment significantly affects volatility, particularly during 
the subprime crisis. Indeed, the panic and fear sentiments towards the impact of 
subprime crisis in financial markets reinforce investors to rapidly sell their 
stocks. Therefore, American investor sentiment provides an important ability in 
decreasing stock prices and consequently increasing volatility. Furthermore, this 
dramatic decrease in stock prices significantly affects the investor's feelings and 
emotions. Indeed, the variance decomposition results clearly show that returns 
shocks present an important source of volatility of investor sentiment variation 
during the subprime crisis period.  
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  The analysis of volatility spillover between investor sentiment and S&P 
500 returns, conducted by estimating the BEKK-GARCH model, suggests that 
investor sentiment plays a determinant role in the spillover of volatility to returns 
during subprime crisis, implying a high volatility of returns. In addition, we find 
a unidirectional mean spillover from returns to investor sentiment.  
 
  These results are important to individual and institutional investors. They 
can use the sentiment indicators to predict volatility of returns in financial 
markets, especially during crisis periods.   
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